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In this work, we demonstrate a new way to perform classical multiparty computing amongst
parties with limited computational resources. Our method harnesses quantum resources to increase
the computational power of the individual parties. We show how a set of clients restricted to linear
classical processing are able to jointly compute a non-linear multivariable function that lies beyond
their individual capabilities. The clients are only allowed to perform classical XOR gates and single-
qubit gates on quantum states. We also examine the type of security that can be achieved in this
limited setting. Finally, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation using photonic qubits, that
allows four clients to compute a specific example of a multiparty function, the pairwise AND.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to communicate and perform computations
between parties in a network has become the cornerstone
of the modern information age. As more and more par-
ties with limited resources become connected in wide-
scale distributed systems, a critical need is to develop
efficient protocols for multiparty computations (MPC),
both in terms of communication load and computing ca-
pability [1–4].
One approach to efficiently performing MPC is by ex-
ploiting quantum resources. It has been shown that mea-
surements on specific types of entangled states (GHZ
states [5]), when controlled by a linear computer, are
sufficient to compute non-linear universal functions [6].
Based on that result, it has been demonstrated that MPC
under specific assumptions (use of a trusted party, re-
stricted adversaries) is secure, by virtue of the quantum
correlations of a GHZ state [7]. Similar results have re-
cently been shown in a client-server scenario, where a
client restricted to linear (XOR) operations is enabled to
securely delegate the computation of a universal boolean
function to a quantum server [8, 9]. The idea behind
all these protocols is to use quantum resources in order
to compute classical functions more efficiently, without
having to build a fully-fledged quantum computer.
In this work, we propose a new way of computing non-
linear multivariable functions using only linear classical
computing and limited manipulation of quantum infor-
mation. We examine the scenario where a number of
clients want to jointly compute a boolean function of
their inputs. We consider that the clients have limited
computing capabilities, namely access to linear (XOR)
functionalities. We show how quantum resources can en-
able such limited clients to securely compute non-linear
functions, the complexity of which lies beyond their com-
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FIG. 1. A sketch of our scheme for multiparty computation,
where a server computes a boolean function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
with inputs xi from different clients. The server generates
simple computational resources, such as single qubits, and
sends them consecutively to a number of different clients.
Each client manipulates the computational resources by per-
forming single qubit gates. At the end, the server measures
the output state. The result of this measurement is sent to
the clients, who can deduce the result of the computation.
puting capability. Since access to XOR gates alone is not
sufficient for universal classical computing, the clients’
computational power is enhanced by means of manipula-
tion of quantum resources provided by a server.
To demonstrate this boost of computational capabili-
ties using quantum resources, we will focus on a partic-
ular example of classical non-linear multiparty computa-
tion (the pairwise AND function) that requires as little
as one single qubit of communication between the clients.
Due to the low quantum communication cost required for
the evaluation of this function, the proposed protocol can
be used as a building block for more complex computa-
tions.
The basic idea of our approach is shown in Fig. 1.
A quantum server generates a single qubit that is sent
through a chain of clients. Each of the clients applies a
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
06
14
4v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
21
 A
ug
 20
17
2rotation on the received quantum state according to their
classical input. The quantum state is then sent back to
the server, which performs a measurement to obtain the
result of the computation. Our protocol is designed in
such a way that the input of each client remains hidden
from the other clients and from the server. Furthermore,
the result of the computation remains hidden from the
server and is sent back to the clients in an encrypted fash-
ion, meaning that the server performs the computation
without learning anything about the result.
THEORY
Our aim is to compute a non-linear boolean function
f(x1, · · · , xn) on input bits xi ∈ {0, 1}. We focus on a
particular example of a basic multivariable boolean func-
tion, the pairwise AND:
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
n⊕
j=1
(
xj+1 ·
( j⊕
i=1
xi
))
(1)
The addition and multiplication are the XOR operation
and the logical AND operation respectively over the field
F2. If the function in Eqn. 1 was linear, then a change in
the assignment of one of the variables would either always
change the value of the function or would never change
it. However it is easy to verify that the function at hand
does not follow this rule, and as a non-linear function,
it cannot be computed using only linear operations in
F2, such as XOR, but necessitates the use of non-linear
operations like NAND.
Now let us define by U = Ry(pi/2) the rotation around
the y-axis of the Bloch sphere (i.e. Ry(θ) = e
−iθσy/2).
Then the following equation can be used to compute the
function f = f(x1, . . . , xn) in Eqn. 1:
(U†)⊕ixiUxn · · ·Ux2Ux1 |0〉 = |f〉 (2)
The fact that Eqn. 2 uses only linear processing and oper-
ations on a single qubit to compute a non-linear function
demonstrates the computational power that quantum re-
sources can provide. Eqn. 2 can also be thought of in
the clients-server setting described in Fig. 1, where each
client Ci has an input bit xi and performs an operation
on the received qubit before forwarding it to the next
client. By adding extra rotations V = Ry(pi) around the
y-axis, we can transform Eqn. 2 in the following way:
(U†)⊕ixi V rnUxn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cn
... V r2Ux2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2
V r1Ux1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C1
|0〉 = |r ⊕ f〉 (3)
where ri ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , n, and r =
⊕
i ri. As we
will see in the following sections, this extra V operation
will provide some layer of security on top of the computa-
tional boost of the clients’ power, in the case where there
are dishonest participants.
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FIG. 2. Protocol for delegated multiparty computation. For
a description of the protocol see main text.
The protocol. The server generates a single qubit in
the state |0〉 that is sent to client C1. C1 applies V r1Ux1
on the received qubit, according to input bit x1 and a
randomly selected bit r1 and sends the qubit on to the
second client C2, who applies V
r2Ux2 ; this procedure
continues until all the clients have applied their gates to
the qubit (see Figure 2). The last operation U† depends
on the global XOR of the clients’ inputs, computed using
a classical routine described below, and can be applied
by any client. The resulting state |r ⊕ f〉 contains the
value of the function up to a random bit flip r (due to
Eqn. 3).
The qubit is then sent back to the server where a mea-
surement is performed in the computational basis and
announces the outcome r ⊕ f . The clients then locally
compute the XOR of the random bits of the other clients
and perform the last XOR operation f = r ⊕ (r ⊕ f) to
retrieve the result of the computation.
For the computation of the global XOR of both the
inputs and the random bits, we consider that the clients
run a classical routine that involves using their local XOR
boxes to share their classical information among them.
During the XOR routine, we assume that the clients com-
municate between them via secure classical channels that
have been established by classical or QKD algorithms.
The XOR routine. For i, j = 1, . . . , n, each client
Cj uses his local XOR box to choose random bits x
i
j , r
i
j ∈
{0, 1}, such that xj =
⊕n
i=1 x
i
j and rj =
⊕n
i=1 r
i
j and
sends xij and r
i
j to client Ci. Each client Ci then uses
3his local XOR box to compute x˜i =
⊕n
j=1 x
i
j and r˜i =⊕n
j=1 r
i
j . When the designated client needs to perform
the operation U†, the rest of the clients send x˜i to that
client, who uses his local box to compute the global XOR
(since
⊕n
i=1 xi =
⊕n
i=1 x˜i).
At the end of the protocol, when the server announces
the value of the measurement r⊕ f , all clients broadcast
r˜i, so that all clients can compute the value r. Of course,
a sequential announcement of the clients will give the
last client the ability to learn the output of the computa-
tion first, and then abort the protocol. More complicated
ways of secret-sharing values and broadcast channels us-
ing threshold schemes could be used instead, but that
would defeat the purpose of this paper which is to show
how simple manipulation of quantum states can boost
the computational power of limited clients.
Security. As mentioned, the goal of this work is to
demonstrate how quantum information can increase the
computational abilities of parties in a client-server set-
ting; however, the introduction of V rotations in Eqn. 3
allows for some level of security in a passive adversarial
model. More explicitly, we assume that both the server
and the clients are interested in completing the compu-
tation, and will therefore act according to the protocol;
they might however leak some information to an attacker
that gains access to their records. We therefore assume
that the server sends |0〉 single-qubit states during the
protocol, and no multiple copies of the same qubit or
parts of entangled states, but might leak the classical re-
sult of the measurement to an eavesdropper. The need
to use single copies of quantum states in our protocol
is also what distinguishes this work from the previous
single-client single-server protocol [9], where using cobits
(i.e. systems capable of being in a coherent superposition
of two states) was sufficient for secure classical comput-
ing.
The privacy of the secret input bits of the clients is
maintained against someone who acquires a copy of the
server’s data, since all information that the latter can
retrieve is equivalent to the sequence of gates applied,
which is in turn equal to V r⊕f . Since the term in the ex-
ponent represents padded information, the server cannot
retrieve more information than that contained in r ⊕ f ,
which is indeed the expected outcome of measurement.
Furthermore, security against dishonest clients is also
maintained, even if we allow them to prepare quantum
states and perform measurements on the received states.
This is again due to the V rotation that is chosen uni-
formly at random and performed by all honest clients on
the qubit. To see this more clearly, we examine the case
when the first honest client in the chain, Ci, applies his
rotation on the received qubit. We can assume without
loss of generality that the qubit is prepared by the dis-
honest clients in the XZ plane, since all rotations by the
honest clients are done on that plane, therefore any com-
ponent outside the plane will not be affected. The honest
operation on any pure state |ψ〉 on the XZ plane, results
in the totally mixed state:
1
2
∑
ri
V riUxi |ψ〉〈ψ|(U†)xi(V †)ri = UxiI2(U†)xi
which ensures that no information is leaked to the next
clients. As in the case of the server however, we need to
restrict the clients’ malicious behavior to sending single
qubit states or equivalently that the honest rotation is
done on one qubit. Finally, the client responsible for the
last U† rotation will unavoidably learn the parity of the
inputs of the rest of the clients, but as long as at least two
clients are honest, it is enough to guarantee the secrecy
of the independent inputs.
Efficiency and comparison to previous proto-
cols. A common way to perform multiparty computa-
tions is via expressing the desired circuits as a sequence of
smaller gates, for example 2-input universal gates. Previ-
ous work [8] can therefore be re-interpreted as a protocol
that computes the NAND of the inputs of two clients.
However, a straightforward extension of this to a multi-
variable function would prove very costly, requiring one
qubit, up to two Ry rotations and several rounds of clas-
sical communication to compute the necessary XORs, for
each AND evaluation in the function. By just looking at
the quantum communication needed in the new proto-
col (which requires a single qubit to compute the pair-
wise AND) we observe an immediate gain in efficiency.
Furthermore, a straightforward implementation of a con-
struction based on [8] guarantees no security for the in-
puts of the parties, since the XORs necessary for the
application of U† are on 2 bits, therefore the client who
performs the latter unavoidably learns the input of the
other client.
Finally, previous studies of boolean function evalua-
tion in the measurement-based quantum computation
model [10] required an (n + 1)-extended GHZ state to
compute the pairwise AND function of Eqn. 1 while to
compute other boolean functions (i.e. n-tuple AND func-
tion), the resource state should have 2n − 1 qubits. In
constrast, the presented protocol does not require any
entanglement in the quantum state, and uses only one
qubit to compute the pairwise AND function, while for
the n-tuple AND function, it requires at most n−1 qubits
(one qubit for each AND operation), giving an exponen-
tial decrease on the number of qubits used.
EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
We implement the protocol using polarisation-encoded
photonic qubits with |0〉 (|1〉) being the horizontal (ver-
tical) polarisation state. Single photons are generated
by pumping a waveguided periodically poled Potassium
4r1x1
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globalXOR
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FIG. 3. Experimental scheme. The server generates heralded,
horizontally polarized photons, which are sent to the clients’
side. Each client uses a pair of half-wave plates for applying
the gates V ri and Uxi . If xi or ri are equal to zero, the set-
ting of the respective half-wave plate is chosen to be zero. If
xi or ri are equal to one, the corresponding half-wave plate
is rotated by an angle θ with respect to the horizontal polar-
isation state, where θ is given in the Figure. Finally, one of
the clients performs a final conditional rotation dependent on
⊕ixi. The photon is sent back to the server, where a measure-
ment in the computational basis is performed; this has been
implemented using a Wollaston prism and two single-photon
APDs.
Titanium Oxide Phosphate crystal with a mode-locked
Ti:Sapphire laser (τ = 200 fs, λ = 775 nm, 250 kHz rep-
etition rate). After spectral filtering, we obtain pairs
of photons at 1547 nm (horizontal polarisation) and
1553 nm (vertical polarisation), each with 2 nm spectral
bandwidth (FWHM). The photons are detected using In-
GaAs avalanche photodetectors (APD) [11, 12].
Using this source, the server generates heralded single
photons in state |0〉 which are sent to the clients’ side
via 15m-long polarisation-maintaining (PM) fibres. Each
client Ci has access to a series of half-wave plates (HWPs)
for implementing the quantum gates Uxi and V ri (see
Fig. 3):
Ci = UHWP
(pi
4
· ri
)
UHWP
(
−pi
8
· xi
)
(4)
where UHWP (θ) is a HWP with optical axis rotated by
θ. In order to demonstrate all the features of function f ,
we choose to implement a setup with four clients. This
could be easily extended straightforwardly to a scheme
with an arbitrary number of clients. The overall unitary
evolution of the system is then described by the following
sequence of operators:
UHWP (0)UHWP
(pi
8
· ⊕ixi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
final rotation
C4 C3 C2 C1︸ ︷︷ ︸
client chain
|0〉 , (5)
up to a global phase factor. For the purpose of our
demonstration, UHWP (0) can be omitted as it has no
effect on the correctness of the demonstration.
Finally, single photons are coupled into another PM
fibre and sent back to server. Here, they are measured
in the computational basis using a polarisation splitter
(extinction ratio >60 dB) and two APDs connected to
the output arms.
We performed measurements on all possible 32 se-
quences of the input bits xi. For each sequence, all possi-
ble combinations of the padding bits ri have been tested.
Fig. 4a shows statistics of the results for a subset of in-
put configurations. The average probability of finding
the correct result was measured (99.53 ± 0.03)%, where
we assumed Poissonian statistics for the errors. Imperfec-
tions arise from state preparation, polarisation manipu-
lation and polarisation measurements, and darks counts.
Fig. 4b shows results for the same input, but averaged
over all combinations of random bits ri, resulting in a
flat distribution. The values we obtain for the average
outcome of the computation lie between (49.95 ± 0.03)%
and (50.06 ± 0.03)% with an average of (50.00 ± 0.03)%.
These values are computed from the raw counts corrected
by the coupling efficiencies. This shows that the server
could not infer any information from the outcomes of
its measurements. The main limiting factor in the cor-
rectness of the result is lies uncertainty in wave-plates
positioning and polarisation crosstalk introduced by PM
fibre connectors.
Fig. 4c shows the long-time stability of our system: we
repeated the same computation several times over a time
interval of 13 hours and studied drift in our experiment.
The average correctness over this time was 99.43 % with a
standard deviation of 0.08 %. The correctness decreases
from (99.52 ± 0.02)% to (99.27 ± 0.06)%; the drop in
probability is caused by drifts in the coupling to the fibres
and polarisation drifts.
Security of implementation. In addition to the
theoretical security aspects discussed above, in our im-
plementation we choose the wave-plate settings in such
a way that there is no phase shift between the states |0〉
and |1〉 that could leak information about the inputs. As
already discussed in [9], global phase shifts could leak
information if the server, for example, sends part of an
entangled state. However, this approach would require an
interferometrically stable setup, which is an unlikely con-
dition for a real-life implementation. Furthermore, the
protocol requires the use of single qubits and a single-shot
implementation in order to be secure. For the purpose
of computing statistics for our proof-of-principle demon-
stration, we averaged over several runs of the experiment
that used the same input settings. We note, however,
that this would leak information about the inputs or the
result to a malicious party; therefore in a realistic imple-
mentation, single-shot experiments would be required.
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FIG. 4. (a) Measured outcomes of the computation after decoding r ⊕ (r ⊕ f) for a sample subset (x1, x2, x3, x4) of the input
bits tested (horizontal axis). (b) Measured outcomes of the computation before decoding (r ⊕ f), averaged over all possible
combinations of ri, i = 1, . . . , 4. For each data point, we integrated over 15 seconds, yielding an overall statistics of about
3000 counts for each computation performed. (c) Long term stability of our experiment. The graph shows the probability of
obtaining the correct outcome measured over 13 hours of data acquirement. Every point of the plot corresponds to the average
over one hour of measurement time. The combination of the clients’ input bits used here is (x1, x2, x3, x4)=(1,1,1,1).
CONCLUSION
In this work, we demonstrate a novel way to perform
non-linear classical multiparty computations by exploit-
ing single qubits and access to restricted linear processes.
This is done through studying a specific boolean function
that can be thought of as a building block for more com-
plex computations.
Even though the main focus of this work is the boost-
ing of the computational capabilities of limited clients
manipulating single qubits, by introducing some extra
rotations we can guarantee security under assumptions
on the adversarial behavior of the participants. In this
setting, the classical data obtained during the protocol do
not leak any information, given that the adversaries act
in a restricted way. Since the goal was to keep the clients’
quantum capabilities as limited as possible, it would de-
feat the purpose of this study to allow them to perform
any check on the correct behavior of the server or the
other clients. If we would consider a setting where the
clients are enhanced with quantum measurement devices,
security of the protocol could be increased by checking
the mean photon number (however see [13] for a discus-
sion on attacks and countermeasures on commercial de-
vices).
Our work also offers many avenues for further research.
For example, are there more simple non-linear functions
like the one presented here that can be used as subrou-
tines for larger computation protocols? And more gener-
ally, what is the most efficient way to perform complex
computations when we have access to limited quantum
and classical resources? Finally, surprisingly enough, this
boosting of computational power is possible with the use
of single qubits, and without the need of the type of
contextuality mentioned in [14], opening a discussion on
whether some other form of contextuality is relevant in
this setting.
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